Pakistan Adrift by Asad Durrani

Author:Asad Durrani
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2018-09-19T16:00:00+00:00

The World’s Best

A few years after 9/11, ISI was sometimes declared the best of its kind in the world. Though gratified, it took me back to the period when it had started causing alarm precisely for being too good for its own good.

Indeed, it was not always that famous or that feared. When tasked to provide covert aid to the Mujahedeen soon after the Soviet invasion, it did so on a modest scale and by keeping a low profile. (I learnt about it merely by chance from an old colleague during my briefing as Defence Attaché designate in early 1980.) However, two years later, the involvement of the US and other Western countries in the region catapulted the ISI from a small-time player that undertook to punch above its weight into the big leagues, rubbing shoulders with the best in the game. Unsurprisingly, the ISI became a source of great concern, not only for its foes.

One may assume that the Intelligence agencies within a country and those from friendly nations cooperate as a matter of course, but in real life it is rare. BB had only one rationale for not creating a coordinating mechanism, and it was certainly not a very common concern. Spy agencies are possessive about their turf and their sources are reluctant to part with potentially valuable leads, and quite often it is doubt about the quality or veracity of information that prevents them from sharing it, lest they be embarrassed. It took a 9/11 for the US to create a halfway-coordinating house. Between the CIA and the ISI, however, communication and coordination worked well as long as the Soviets were in Afghanistan. The shared objective, the defeat of the occupation, was one reason; respect for each other’s turf was the other more important one. The CIA hardly ever questioned how its Pakistani counterpart dispensed with the resources provided for the Jihad, or for that matter how it was conducted. And the ISI never asked if the American providers were overpricing the ordnance or undermining the Saudi contribution. It did not mean that they trusted each other.

Differences surfaced as soon as the Soviets withdrew. When I joined the ISI in August 1990, they were coming to the fore. Some of the key ISI operatives were vilified, allegedly for having favoured the more radical of the Afghan groups. The charges that the Agency was infested with rogue elements have continued ever since. Twice, under the American pressure, there were major purges in the ISI’s rank and file. If these ever led to a change in the policy is another matter. In the early 1990s, we in the ISI understood this shift in the American attitude as its desire to establish hegemony and, more crucially, now that the Soviet Union after its exit from Afghanistan had ceased to exist, to cut this upstart service to size.

The CIA was clearly at odds with our declared objective to help the Mujahedeen lead the new dispensation in Kabul, especially if individuals like Hikmatyar were to play any role in it.

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